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UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS AT LITTLE ROCK
LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 9 1986-87 NUMBER 2
THE ARKANSAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS*
Susan Webber Wright**
Following are the first two chapters of a short treatise on the Ar-
kansas law of oil and gas. Additional chapters on Conveyances, Leases,
and Pooling and Unitization will follow in later issues of the U.A.L.R.
Law Journal. This treatise is not intended as an in-depth analysis, but
rather as a description of the current state of the law which, the author
hopes, will be helpful to those not regularly engaged in the oil and gas
law practice.
CHAPTER I
NATURE OF OIL AND GAS INTERESTS
This chapter is an introduction to the law of oil and gas and exam-
ines the basic types of oil and gas interests and how they differ from
each other. An understanding of these differences, though elementary
to the oil and gas practitioner, is crucial to an understanding of what
follows in the chapters on deeds and leases. The chapter includes a
discussion on adverse possession of oil and gas interests in Arkansas.
Also included is Arkansas authority on the rule of capture and reme-
dies for the mineral owner in those situations in which the rule of cap-
ture does not apply.
All oil and gas interests are interests in real property and are con-
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veyed, devised and inherited like other interests in real property. The
basic interests in oil and gas are the leasehold, mineral, and royalty
interests, which differ from each other in significant respects.
Leasehold Interests
The leasehold interest is conveyed to the lessee in the oil and gas
lease. Most Arkansas cases addressing the question have characterized
this interest as being in the nature of an easement." According to these
decisions, the lessee does not acquire any title to the minerals by virtue
of the lease alone. Title passes only when the oil and gas are reduced to
the lessee's possession.' However, in the 1982 decision of Hillard v.
Stephens,s the Arkansas Supreme Court held that a "gas lease consti-
tutes a present sale of all of the gas in place at the time such lease is
executed,' but cited no authority for this holding. If the court in-
tended to change the Arkansas law on this point, it did not say so.
If the lessee's interest is an easement, it is incorporeal and can be
lost by abandonment. Arkansas cases have so held.' The Arkansas Su-
preme Court has also held that a leasehold interest is not partitionable,
presumably because it is incorporeal. The Hillard decision might have
changed the Arkansas law so that a lease is now a conveyance of the
minerals themselves. If so, Arkansas now follows the Texas view that a
lease is a conveyance of defeasible fee title to the minerals.7 Because
1. Garvan v. Kimsey, 239 Ark. 295, 297, 389 S.W.2d 870, 871 (1965); Pasteur v. Nis-
wanger, 226 Ark. 486, 488, 290 S.W.2d 852, 853 (1956); Clark v. Dennis, 172 Ark. 1096, 1097,
291 S.W. 807, 808 (1927); Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana v. Oil Well Salvage Co., 170 Ark. 729,
738, 281 S.W. 360, 363 (1926).
2. See, e.g., Pasteur v. Niswanger, 226 Ark. 486, 488, 290 S.W.2d 852, 853 (1956); Osborn
v. Arkansas Territorial Oil & Gas Co., 103 Ark. 175, 180, 146 S.W. 122, 124 (1912).
3. 276 Ark. 545, 637 S.W.2d 581 (1982); Note, Hillard v. Stephens: Interpretation of Mar-
ket Price Royalty Provisions in Natural Gas Leases, 36 ARK. L. REV. 312 (1982).
4. 276 Ark. at 550, 637 S.W.2d at 583.
5. See. e.g., Zappia v. Garner, 259 Ark. 794, 796, 536 S.W.2d 714, 715 (1976); Mansfield
Gas Co. v. Alexander, 97 Ark. 167, 133 S.W. 837 (1911).
6. Pasteur v. Niswanger, 226 Ark. 486, 290 S.W.2d 852 (1956). The court explained: "Own-
ers of leasehold working interests are not co-tenants of the owners of the fee or surface of the
land. Their interests are of a different kind. Their interests are also of a different kind to the
interests of the owners of mineral rights where severed from the land." Id. at 488-89, 290 S.W.2d
at 853. Associate Justice Darrell Hickman wrote a casenote on this decision when he was a stu-
dent; see Note, Oil and Gas - Partition - Interest of Lessee, 11 ARK. L. REV. 186 (1957),
which points out that some Arkansas decisions have recognized the lessee's interest as corporeal
for some purposes and concludes that this interest should be partitionable under the general parti-
tion statute, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1801 (1947) amended by ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1801 (Supp.
1985).
7. See, e.g., Sheffield v. Hogg, 124 Tex. 290, 77 S.W.2d 1021 (1934); Stephens County v.
Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923). According to one authority,
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minerals in Arkansas are "owned in place" and the mineral estate is a
corporeal interest, a lessee's interest logically would be corporeal and
subject to partition but not to abandonment. Furthermore, if a lease
constitutes the sale of the minerals in place, one co-lessee would be
required to account to other lessees for minerals produced, which is not
required if the lease conveys only an easement.8 There is no indication
that the Arkansas Supreme Court intended this result from its state-
ment that a lease constitutes a sale of the minerals in place, but the
question remains unresolved.
Mineral Interests
In Arkansas the mineral interest may be severed by grant or reser-
vation from the surface and become a separate estate.' A severed min-
eral interest is corporeal and, like a fee interest in the surface, cannot
be abandoned by its owner.10 Unlike a leasehold, a mineral estate held
in undivided ownership is partitionable under the Arkansas statutes,
and partition is available to any undivided owner, no matter how small
the fractional interest.1 The owner of the mineral estate has the right
to develop the minerals (the development right) and the right to lease
the minerals (the executive right). This owner also has the power to
convey an interest in the minerals to others. For example, he can con-
vey an undivided interest in the minerals, or he can convey a royalty
interest. It is even possible to convey an interest in minerals with a
reservation of the executive right.18
The owner of the mineral estate has an easement of reasonable use
of the surface for the purpose of developing the minerals.1 4 The extent
Texas, Mississippi, and New Mexico are the only jurisdictions that regard the lease as creating a
corporeal interest. R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAs, § 5.6,'at 218-19, n.32 (2d ed.
1983).
8. Budd v. Ethyl Corp., 251 Ark. 639, 474 S.W.2d 411 (1971).
9. See, e.g., Schnitt v. McKellar, 244 Ark. 377, 386-87, 427 S.W.2d 202, 208 (1968);
Huffman v. Henderson Co., 184 Ark. 278, 285, 42 S.W.2d 221, 224 (1931).
10. Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Goode, 160 Ark. 48, 61, 254 S.W. 345, 349 (1923).
11. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-401 to -409 (1971 & Supp. 1985). This presumably does not
apply to tenancies by the entirety, which are not partitionable in Arkansas except when the parties
are divorced. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1801 (Supp. 1985).
12. E.g., Schnitt v. McKellar, 244 Ark. 377, 390, 427 S.W.2d 202, 210 (1968) (citing Over-
ton v. Porterfield, 206 Ark. 784, 177 S.W.2d 735 (1944)).
13. There is a split of authority on whether one who owns no interest in the minerals can own
the executive rights. See, e.g., Dallapi v. Campbell, 45 Cal. App. 2d 541, 114 P.2d 646 (1941)
(executive right in one who has no mineral ownership violates rule against perpetuities) and Stone
v. Texoma Production Co., 336 P.2d 1099 (Okla. 1959) (one who owns only a royalty may own
the executive right).
14. E.g., Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips, 256 Ark. 886, 511 S.W.2d 160 (1974).
1986-87]
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of this easement is the same as the right of a lessee to the reasonable
use of the surface and is discussed in the chapter on mineral leases.
Royalty Interests
A royalty interest entitles its owner to a share of the minerals pro-
duced. Although a royalty is generally reserved by the lessor in a min-
eral lease, it is also possible for a mineral owner to convey a royalty to
another party, which would entitle that party to a share in the minerals
should minerals ever be produced. A royalty in Arkansas is real prop-
erty until the minerals are produced, at which time it is personalty.'8
The owner of a royalty interest ordinarily does not have any right
to go upon the surface to explore and develop minerals or to lease the
minerals. The term "non-participating royalty""' refers to a royalty in-
terest that does not share in bonus and delay rentals, which are other
proceeds received by the lessor pursuant to a lease. 17
Adverse Possession
If there has been no severance of the minerals from the surface,
adverse possession of the surface is also adverse possession of the min-
erals, even if minerals have not been produced.'8 The adverse claimant
of a severed mineral interest must open and operate mines for the stat-
utory period in order to gain title by adverse possession." The applica-
ble limitations statutes are the same as for adverse possession of other
real property interests,20 and the adverse claimant's activities must be
open and notorious." Leasing the minerals, without any drilling or
15. See, e.g., Clampitt v. Ponder, 91 F. Supp. 535 (W.D. Ark. 1950); Shreveport-El Dorado
Pipe Line Co. v. Bennett, 172 Ark. 804, 811, 290 S.W. 929, 931 (1927).
16. For a brief general description of the litigated issues surrounding the nonparticipating
royalty, see H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS, at 555-56 (6th ed.
1984).
17. The proceeds of a lease are described in the chapter on mineral leases. If the mineral
ownership is divided between life tenants and remainder interests, special rules govern entitlement
to lease proceeds. These rules are discussed in the chapter on multiple ownership.
18. E.g., Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 442 P.2d 692, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1968).
There are no Arkansas cases directly in point, but this principle can be inferred from the decisions
in Buckner v. Wright, 218 Ark. 448, 236 S.W.2d 720 (1951) and Claybrooke v. Barnes, 180 Ark.
678, 22 S.W.2d 390 (1929).
19. See Taylor v. Scott, 285 Ark. 102, 103-04, 685 S.W.2d 160, 161 (1985); Garvan v.
Potlatch Corp., 278 Ark. 414, 417, 645 S.W.2d 957, 959 (1983); Hurst v. Rice, 278 Ark. 94, 99,
643 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1982); Thweatt v. Halmes, 265 Ark. 606, 580 S.W.2d 685 (1979); Skelly
Oil Co. v. Johnson, 209 Ark. 1107, 1121-22, 194 S.W.2d 425, 432 (1946).
20. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-101 to -114 (1962 & Supp. 1985).
21. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Excelsior Coal Co., 298 F. 884 (8th Cir. 1924); Adams v.
Bruder, 275 Ark. 19, 627 S.W.2d 12 (1982); Brizzolara v. Powell, 214 Ark. 870, 218 S.W.2d 728
[Vol. 9:223
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mining activity, does not constitute adverse possession.22
In a 1985 Arkansas Supreme Court case the successor to an ad-
verse claimant of the surface claimed that adverse possession extended
to the mineral estate as well because the deed severing an undivided
one-half interest in the minerals remained unrecorded until after the
limitations title had been perfected. The court held that the unrecorded
deed, which had been executed and delivered prior to the onset of the
adverse possession, was effective against the adverse possessor and his
grantee.23
An interesting question arises when there has been adverse posses-
sion of one mineral and the claimant contends that he has thereby ac-
quired adverse title to all of the minerals. Mineral producing jurisdic-
tions are in conflict on this issue.2 4 In the 1982 case of Hurst v. Rice,25
the holder of a void tax title to the minerals claimed that she was the
owner of the coal by adverse possession because she had been receiving
gas royalties for fifteen years pursuant to an earlier court decree that
she was the owner of the oil and gas. The Arkansas Supreme Court
held that "[s]uch a claim from gas production goes to the gas only and
the drilling and production of a gas is not adverse to the mining or
stripping of coal, a solid mineral. '2 6 The court carefully limited its
holding, stating that it was not deciding that drilling and producing gas
could never be adverse to the mining of a solid mineral, or that the
mining of one mineral could never be adverse to other minerals.2 7
Another question concerning adverse possession of a mineral inter-
est arises when the adverse claimant enters at a time when title to the
(1949); Claybrooke v. Barnes, 180 Ark. 678, 22 S.W.2d 390 (1923).
22. See Adams v. Bruder, 275 Ark. 19, 627 S.W.2d 12 (1982). The rule might be inferred
from the holding in Laney v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 233 Ark. 645, 348 S.W.2d 826 (1961), in
which the prior owner's lessee was deemed not to be in constructive possession of all minerals in a
lease when production was only from part of the leasehold.
23. Taylor v. Scott, 285 Ark. 102, 104, 685 S.W.2d 160, 161 (1985). The court reasoned
that the adverse possessor does not rely upon the record and that the recording statute is designed
to protect subsequent purchasers from the same grantor, not trespassers. Id.
24. See 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 224.4, at 370.1-370.4 (1985).
25. 278 Ark. 94, 643 S.W.2d 563 (1982).
26. Id. at 99, 643 S.W.2d at 565.
27. Id. In a "non-ownership" jurisdiction where the owner of the minerals has only an ease-
ment and does not own the minerals "in place," it is conceivable that the adverse possession of one
mineral by mining would be adverse to others as well on grounds that the mining operation itself
would obstruct the mining of other minerals. Because the owner has only an easement, effective
obstruction of the easement for the statutory period should suffice. See Gerhard v. Stephens, 68
Cal. 2d 864, 442 P.2d 692, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1968). For a view that actual mining of the
minerals should be required to perfect an adverse title in a "non-ownership" jurisdiction, see R.
HEMINGWAY. supra note 7, § 3.5(A).
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minerals and surface is in the same owner but the minerals are severed
before the limitation title ripens. In this event the adverse possessor
takes title to the minerals as well as to the surface. 8 This result can be
explained by the relation back of the limitation title to when the ad-
verse possessor first entered, when the title was unified.
Sometimes adverse possession is not actual but constructive, based
upon payment of taxes and color of title, as provided in the Arkansas
statutes.2 In one Arkansas case, Burbridge v. Rosen,30 an adverse
claimant with color of title paid taxes on an unimproved and unen-
closed tract for seven years, then conveyed the surface and reserved the
minerals in the eighth year. The court held that title to the minerals
was in the claimant because of payment of taxes under color of title
and because of the reservation. 1 Years later another claimant with
color of title paid taxes on the land for sixteen years but did not ac-
quire title to the minerals because of the prior severance. This case
illustrates that constructive possession can operate like actual adverse
possession: if title is severed at the time the adverse possession of the
surface begins, the adverse possession does not extend to the minerals.
If title is unified when adverse possession begins, however, the adverse
possession of the surface extends to the mineral estate as well, which
can be later severed.
Burbridge does not address the question whether one who has
color of title to the minerals only may take constructive adverse posses-
sion through payment of taxes for seven years on unenclosed and unim-
proved land. The court subsequently held that the statute is not availa-
ble for perfecting title to minerals only, as its reference to unenclosed
land indicates no legislative intent that it could be applied to a mineral
interest "[s]ince minerals within the earth are not susceptible of
inclosure.'
Because of well-spacing rules and unitization, it might be impossi-
ble for an adverse claimant to engage in on-premises mining activities.
Thus the question arises whether one can claim title by adverse posses-
sion by entering into a voluntary pooling agreement for the production
28. See, e.g., Ates v. Yellow Pine Land Co., 310 So. 2d 772 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
There are no Arkansas cases on this point. See R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 7, § 3.4 (C), at 146.
29. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-102 (1962).
30. 240 Ark. 500, 400 S.W.2d 502 (1966).
31. Id. at 503, 400 S.W.2d at 504.
32. Brizzolara v. Powell, 214 Ark. 870, 872, 218 S.W.2d 728, 729 (1949). See also Jones v.
Brown, 211 Ark. 164, 199 S.W.2d 973 (1947) (adverse possession by payment of taxes did not
include a mineral interest severed between the time of first and last tax payments).
[Vol. 9:223
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of oil and gas. In the Arkansas decision of Brizzolara v. Powell,8" the
court rejected the contention that this was adverse possession, noting
that the claimant did nothing to put the owner on notice." The court
continued:
And the fact that a well drilled on adjacent land may withdraw gas
from the depths of his own property can hardly require a reasonable
man to investigate the possibility that an interloper may have joined
in a pooling agreement purporting to include all land drained by the
well.3
The court said that the result might be different if the property were
placed in a drilling unit by the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission upon
a finding that the well on adjacent land would drain it." There have
been no Arkansas cases in which the adverse claimant was joined in a
drilling unit established by the Oil and Gas Commission. Because all
record owners must receive notice of the establishment of the unit, it is
unlikely that this problem will arise.87
As noted above, a royalty interest is real property in the nature of
a right to receive a portion of the minerals upon production. But the
royalty is personalty once the minerals are produced.38 Two Arkansas
Supreme Court cases have addressed the question whether one can ob-
tain a royalty interest through adverse possession by receiving the roy-
alty payment for the requisite number of years. In the first of these
cases, Warmack v. Henry H. Cross Co.,39 the owner of '/1, of a 1/8 roy-
alty was erroneously paid /8 of 1/8 from 1935 to 1959. When the payor
company discovered its error in 1959, it discontinued payments and the
owner alleged adverse possession, laches, and estoppel. Noting that the
claimant did nothing to give notice that he was claiming adversely to
other royalty owners, the court found that he had obtained nothing by
adverse possession. 40 Likewise, he had no grounds to allege laches or
estoppel against other royalty owners when there was no evidence that
the others knew of the claimant's interest or knew of the erroneous
payments by the oil company. 41 The second case on this issue, Palmer
33. 214 Ark. 870, 218 S.W.2d 728 (1949). See also Adams v. Bruder, 275 Ark. 19, 627
S.W.2d 12 (1982).
34. Brizzolara, 214 Ark. 870, 873, 218 S.W.2d 728, 729 (1949).
35. Id. at 873, 218 S.W.2d at 729.
36. Id.
37. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-115 (1971 & Supp. 1985).
38. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
39. 237 Ark. 869, 377 S.W.2d 47 (1964).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 872-73, 377 S.W.2d at 49.
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v. Lide,42 also involved a claim to continue receiving royalty payments
originally paid in error. Citing Warmack, the court held that there was
no adverse possession by receipt of these payments and no estoppel or
laches to bar the true owners from claiming future payments a.4  The
result in both decisions is undoubtedly correct because neither case in-
volved a claim that met the requisite characteristics of adverse posses-
sion - an open and notorious claim with notice to the true owner for
the statutory period. However it is possible that royalty payments, as
personalty, could be the object of adverse possession if the necessary
elements are present."
The Rule of Capture
The rule of capture, which applies in all jurisdictions despite the
theory of ownership of oil and gas,45 has been defined as: "[t]he legal
rule of non-liability for (1) causing oil or gas to migrate across prop-
erty lines and (2) producing oil or gas that was originally in place
under the land of another, so long as the producing well does not
trespass. "46
In an "ownership-in-place" jurisdiction, such as Arkansas, the re-
sult of the rule is to permit one to reduce to possession and ownership
minerals that initially belonged to a neighbor. Arkansas defined the
rule of capture in a 1912 case, Osborn v. Arkansas Territorial Oil and
Gas Co.: '
Petroleum, gas and oil are substances of a peculiar charac-
ter. . . .They belong to the owner of land, and are part of it so long
as they are part of it or in it or subject to his control; but when they
escape and go into other land or come under another's control, the
title of the former owner is gone. If an adjoining owner drills his own
land and taps a deposit of oil and gas extending under his neighbor's
field, so that it comes into his well, it becomes his property.4'
Of course, the adjoining owner has correlative rights to the oil and gas
in the common pool, and thus the rule of capture coexists with the
42. 263 Ark. 731, 567 S.W.2d 295 (1978).
43. Id. at 734, 567 S.W.2d at 296. The royalty owners who should have received the pay-
ments had signed division orders in which they agreed that their share was less than it was.
Therefore, they could not have properly sought retroactive relief, as the court pointed out.
44. There is an Arkansas decision recognizing adverse possession of shares of stock. Hender-
son v. First Nat'l Bank of Dewitt, 254 Ark. 427, 494 S.W.2d 452 (1973).
45. 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 24, § 204.4, at 55.
46. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 16, at 782.
47. 103 Ark. 175, 146 S.W. 122 (1912).
48. Id. at 180, 146 S.W. at 124 (quoting Brown v. Spilman, 155 U.S. 665, 669-70 (1895)).
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notion that oil and gas are owned in place."9 If the rule were allowed to
operate without governmental regulations, each landowner could drill
as many oil or gas wells as he could afford and could produce as rap-
idly as possible in order to drain the common pool before others did so.
Now that oil and gas producing states regulate production through
pooling, unitization, and well-spacing, the rule of capture does not op-
erate as it would otherwise. In fact, unregulated application of the rule
leads to economic waste and waste of natural resources. Therefore,
state regulation of production in Arkansas is for "the protection of pub-
lic and private interests . . . by prohibiting waste and compelling rata-
ble production." 50 Other producing states regulate production for simi-
lar purposes.
The most significant Arkansas cases on the rule of capture in-
volved brine production when Arkansas had no statutory provisions per-
mitting unitization for brine. 1 In Budd v. Ethyl Corp." the Ethyl Cor-
poration was engaged in a recycling operation in Columbia County in
which brine was removed from the ground through "output" wells, val-
uable bromides were extracted, and the tail (or debrominated) brine
was returned to the earth through "input" wells. The input wells were
in a circle on a leasehold of approximately 16,000 acres, and the output
wells were inside the circle. The injecting of tail brine into the input
wells forced the valuable brine toward the output wells. The appellant
Budd owned an undivided mineral interest in 240 acres outside the cir-
cle but adjacent to the Ethyl leasehold. He also owned an undivided
one-tenth mineral leasehold to forty acres inside the circle. Ethyl Cor-
poration owned the remaining leasehold interest and the fee to this
forty acres. Budd filed suit, claiming that Ethyl should account to him
for his share of the extracted minerals from each tract.
The court held that the rule of capture applied to the drainage of
brine from Budd's tract outside the leasehold." As to the tract on the
leasehold in which Budd held an undivided one-tenth of the leasehold
interest, the court held that Budd had no right to an accounting be-
cause, as a lessee, he was entitled to produce brine just as Ethyl pro-
duced it." The court reasoned that Budd's interest in the minerals was
inchoate because a lessee has an easement, not ownership of minerals
49. See Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558 (1948).
50. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-101 (1971).
51. Arkansas now provides for unitization for brine production. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-1301
to -1320 (Supp. 1985).
52. 251 Ark. 639, 474 S.W.2d 411 (1971).
53. Id. at 641, 474 S.W.2d at 413.




The next decision on the rule of capture as applied to brine pro-
duction was a federal case, Young v. Ethyl Corp.,56 which involved the
same recycling operation as that in Budd. Young's land was inside the
circle of input wells, and brine underlying the surface of his land was
forced into the output wells by Ethyl's recycling process. Young had
refused to lease to Ethyl and sought an injunction, damages, or an ac-
counting for the minerals displaced from his property by Ethyl. The
lower court dismissed his complaint on grounds that the rule of capture
applied to Ethyl's operations,57 citing the Arkansas Supreme Court de-
cision in Budd. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding
that the Budd decision did not address the issue at hand because it did
not involve a plaintiff who owned a fee simple interest within the circle
of injection wells. (Budd only had a leasehold interest within the circle;
he owned a mineral interest outside the recycling operations.) The
court found that Arkansas would not apply the rule of capture to the
recycling operation. It reasoned that the rule of capture traditionally
applied to drainage of fugacious minerals from a common pool, not to
the production of minerals which are forced by artificial means from
the land of one owner into the well of another. The court concluded
that Ethyl's actions constituted a trespass to Young's property and re-
manded the case.58 It is difficult to ascertain whether the court based
its decision on the premise that salt water, or brine, is not fugacious, or
on the fact that the brine was forced to the production wells, not
merely drained by them from the common pool: "We believe that it
would be unwise to extend the rule to situations in which non-fugacious
minerals are forced from beneath a landowner's property. '5 9
Assuming the decision is based upon the premise that brine is not
fugacious, the holding is limited to brine and the rule of capture might
still apply to recovery of oil and gas through secondary recovery opera-
tions. But if the holding is based on the fact that the minerals were
forced into production wells, then the rule of capture should not apply
to secondary recovery of oil and gas. The latter interpretation is more
likely accurate. First, despite what the court indicates, brine is non-
fugacious only in the sense that it is not a liquid or gaseous hydrocar-
bon such as oil or gas. Brine is water, which can be extracted and cap-
55. Id.
56. 521 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1975).
57. Young v. Ethyl Corp., 382 F. Supp. 769 (W.D. Ark. 1974).
58. Young v. Ethyl Corp., 521 F.2d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 1975).
59. Id. at 774.
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tured from a common pool. Second, the court notes that the rule of
capture, formulated at a time when measuring drainage was scientifi-
cally impossible, should not apply as an absolutism today.60 In their
treatise, Williams and Meyers indicate that the Young decision applies
to oil and gas as well as to brine, for they cite it along with cases from
other jurisdictions as taking a position contrary to the so-called "nega-
tive rule of capture," which would permit production through second-
ary recovery operations without liability for displacing minerals under-
lying the land of others.61
Budd and Young did not end the litigation over Ethyl's recycling
operations in Columbia County. In Jameson v. Ethyl Corp.62 the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court held that the rule of capture did not shield
Ethyl Corporation's activities, citing the Young decision as persuasive.
Jameson, like Young, was unable to reach an agreement to lease to
Ethyl and owned land surrounded by Ethyl's leasehold. Ethyl claimed
that the rule of capture permitted it to displace and recover minerals
underlying the Jameson tract, while Jameson alleged that Ethyl's activ-
ities constituted a trespass or nuisance.
The court in Jameson found that the language of the 1912 deci-
sion in Osborn,6 which adopted the rule of capture in Arkansas, does
not "envision processes such as those used by Ethyl in the situation now
under consideration."' Thus, it appears that the Arkansas Supreme
Court probably has rejected application of the rule of capture to sec-
ondary recovery of oil and gas as well as to brine.
. While rejecting Ethyl's position that the rule of capture applies,
the court also rejected Jameson's contention that Ethyl's activities con-
stituted a trespass or a nuisance. The court gave well-considered rea-
sons based upon public policy:
A determination that a trespass or nuisance occurs through secondary
recovery processes within a recovery area would tend to promote
waste of such natural resources and extend unwarranted bargaining
power to minority landowners. On the other hand, a determination
that the rule of capture should be expanded to cover the present situa-
tion could unnecessarily extend the license of mineral extraction com-
panies to appropriate minerals which might be induced to be moved
from other properties through such processes and, in any event, fur-
60. Id.
61. 1 H. WILUAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 24, § 204.5, at 60.5.
62. 271 Ark. 621, 609 S.W.2d 346 (1980).
63. Osborn v. Arkansas Territorial Oil & Gas Corp., 103 Ark. 175, 146 S.W. 122 (1912).
64. 271 Ark. at 627, 609 S.W.2d at 350.
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ther extend the bargaining power of such entities to reduce royalty
payments to landowners who are financially unable to "go and do like-
wise" as suggested by Ethyl.65
The court held that good-faith production of minerals from a com-
mon pool through secondary recovery processes should be permitted to
maximize recovery from the pool. However, such good faith recovery
should be conditioned upon the extracting party's payment of compen-
sation to the owner whose land is depleted "for the minerals extracted
in excess of natural depletion, if any, at the time of taking and for any
special damages which may have been caused to the depleted prop-
erty." 66 The case was remanded to equity.
By rejecting the rule of capture for production from secondary re-
covery operations, Arkansas has joined most other jurisdictions that
have addressed the issue.67 As pointed out in Young and Jameson, the
rule of capture has been criticized in recent times for requiring a result
unfair to those whose mineral losses are capable of some measurement.
The result in Jameson is fair to all concerned: it gives the landowner a
remedy against the producer but does not give him the power to thwart
production by injunction or by excessive compensation for the minerals
taken in excess of natural depletion.
Another situation in which the rule of capture should not apply is
when oil and gas are wasted as a result of negligent operations on ad-
joining land. A famous Texas case, Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co.,68 held
that an adjoining landowner was liable for negligent operation of a well
which caused the well to blow out and valuable hydrocarbons to escape
from beneath the plaintiff's land. The court reasoned that the rule of
capture protects "reasonable and legitimate drainage from the common
pool," 9 and does not extend to "the negligent waste or destruction of
the oil and gas.' 70 Arkansas would probably follow this case, as the
65. Id. at 628-29, 609 S.W.2d at 351.
66. Id. at 629, 609 S.W.2d at 351.
67. See, e.g., Greyhound Leasing & Fin. Corp. v. Joiner City Unit, 444 F.2d 439 (10th Cir.
1971); Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson, 320 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 942
(1963); Baumgartner v. Gulf Oil Co., 184 Neb. 384, 168 N.W.2d 510 (1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 913 (1970). The basis for granting the plaintiff a remedy varies in these cases. See generally
1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 24, § 204.5. Texas is one jurisdiction that permits
secondary recovery without liability, thereby following what Williams and Meyers call the "nega-
tive rule of capture." Railroad Comm'n v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962).
68. 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558 (1948); Note, Rule of Capture Held Not to Limit Recov-
ery for Negligent Destruction of Gas from Common Pool, 62 HARV. L. REv. 146 (1948); see also
Comment, Liability in Texas for Wrongful Drainage of Oil and Gas, 27 TEX. L. REV. 349 (1949).
69. 146 Tex. at 582, 210 S.W.2d at 562.
70. Id.
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Arkansas Supreme Court has indicated that it will not follow the rule
of capture absolutely without regard to policy considerations.7 ' Other
jurisdictions have followed Elliff by refusing to apply the rule of cap-
ture to negligent or wasteful activities.72
Mineral Owners' Remedies for Loss of Oil and Gas
If the rule of capture does not protect the taking of another's oil
and gas, the appropriate remedy can be in trespass, nuisance, conver-
sion, or an accounting, depending upon the circumstances and the juris-
diction. 78 Furthermore, good faith or lack thereof can affect the mea-
sure of damages. Another consideration in measuring damages is
whether it would be feasible for the injured party to mine the minerals
himself.
Arkansas cases involving the wrongful removal of hard minerals
are helpful in ascertaining the remedies for the wrongful removal of oil
and gas. In Ward v. Spadra Coal Co.,7 4 coal lessees on one tract of
land took coal from an adjacent tract, which was leased to the Spadra
Coal Company. The latter sued for the willful and intentional mining
of the coal, naming as defendants the lessees who actually mined the
coal and their lessors. The court found that the defendants had tres-
passed in good faith, that the plaintiff could waive the tort and sue for
the value of the coal taken, and that the appropriate measure of dam-
ages would be the "value of the ore in place in the mine."' 75 In deter-
mining the value in place, the court considered the royalty usually paid
in the locality for mining coal and awarded the plaintiff damages based
upon that royalty, plus interest.
A close reading of the Spadra Coal opinion shows that the court
awarded damages based upon a good faith trespass, but indicated that
it was awarding damages for conversion. This raises the question
whether damages for trespass and conversion are the same for the
wrongful taking of another's minerals. Later cases discussed herein are
helpful in answering this question in the affirmative.
Another decision involving the wrongful taking of a hard mineral
is National Lead Co. v. Magnet Cove Barium Corp.,76 a well-reasoned
71. See Jameson v. Ethyl Corp., 271 Ark. 621, 609 S.W.2d 346 (1980).
72. For a discussion of the approaches in various jurisdictions, see I KUNTZ, OIL AND GAS §
4.4 (1962 & Supp. 1986).
73. See I H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 24, § 204.5.
74. 168 Ark. 853, 272 S.W. 353 (1925).
75. Id. at 857, 272 S.W. at 354.
76. 231 F. Supp. 208 (W.D. Ark. 1964).
1986-87] 235
UALR LAW JOURNAL
opinion written by the late Judge Miller. The plaintiff, National Lead,
alleged that the defendant, an adjoining lessee, had intentionally and
willfully taken barite ore from the plaintiff's land. The defendant ad-
mitted taking some of the plaintiff's ore, but denied that the taking was
willful. In addition to damages for the ore removed from its land, the
plaintiff sought damages for "disturbed" ore left in the ground that was
not recoverable as a result of the defendant's mining activities. The
court found that the defendant's mining personnel were negligent in
their activities which led to the trespass to the plaintiff's property, but
that the negligence did not amount to an intentional, willful trespass.
In accordance with Spadra Coal and other Arkansas decisions," the
court reasoned that damages for nonwillful trespass are based upon the
value of the ore in place. The damages extended not only to the coal
converted by the defendant for its own use, but also to the "disturbed"
ore, which the plaintiff could not remove safely or at a reasonable cost.
The National Lead opinion recognizes two guidelines for deter-
mining the in-place value of minerals. One, the royalty value was ap-
plied by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Spadra Coal. The second is
the value of the minerals after production less the production costs. 7 8
Judge Miller determined that the latter measure of damages was ap-
propriate in National Lead because the plaintiff was a lessee in the
business of mining:
As to a landowner who has not the opportunity nor the equipment to
develop minerals, the amount for which he can lease them, or royalty
value, is the generally accepted measure of damages as to him for an
innocent trespass and conversion of minerals. However, as to the min-
eral lessee with the desire, ability and facilities to mine and develop
minerals, the royalty value does not adequately compensate him for
being deprived of the opportunity to exercise his mining rights ....
By this approach the plaintiff minerals lessee is put in the place it
would have been had it not been deprived of the opportunity of min-
ing its ore, while at the same time depriving the trespasser of any
profit from its wrongdoing, yet inflicting no punishment on the tres-
passer by the allowance of its expenses or costs in removing and devel-
oping the ore.79
77. Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Decker, 179 Ark. 592, 17 S.W.2d 293 (1929); McGraw
v. Berry, 170 Ark. 426, 280 S.W. 383 (1926).
78. See National Lead Co. v. Magnet Cove Barium Corp., 231 F. Supp. 208, 217-28 (W.D.
Ark. 1964). Decisions from other jurisdictions have at times focused on the reasonableness of
production costs, as only reasonable costs are deductible by the good faith trespasser; see, e.g.,
Champlin Ref. Co. v. Aladdin Petroleum Corp., 205 Okla. 524, 528, 238 P.2d 827, 830 (1951).
79. National Lead Co. v. Magnet Cove Barium Corp., 231 F. Supp. 208, 221 (W.D. Ark.
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Judge Miller's reasoning is certainly correct. As he points out,
compensatory damages are awarded to make the plaintiff whole.80 A
plaintiff incapable of producing the minerals can be made whole by an
award based upon royalty. But a plaintiff in the business of mining can
be made whole by awarding that plaintiff the value of produced miner-
als less the reasonable costs of production. By awarding damages for
the "disturbed" ore Judge Miller carried out the purpose of compensat-
ing the injured party for the trespass. Limiting damages only to the ore
taken by the defendant would not have made the plaintiff whole.
In Young v. Ethyl Corp.,8" the facts of which are discussed above,
the Eighth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to grant re-
lief on the grounds of trespass. The district court found that Ethyl had
acted in good faith and awarded Young 169.1/15,040ths of the net
profits, for Young owned 169.1 acres of the 15,040-acre recycling oper-
ation. This award was $1,119,922.24.82 On the second appeal, the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's finding that the trespass was
in good faith, but held that the damages award was excessive.88 The
court reasoned that Young was not in a position to produce the brine
and extract the minerals himself and that no other lessee would under-
take such an operation on Young's relatively small tract." Although
the court cited National Lead, it remanded the case to determine
whether the good faith measure of damages should be based upon roy-
alty or upon the value of the minerals produced less the costs of pro-
duction.8 5 Had the court followed Judge Miller's reasoning in National
Lead, it would have awarded damages based upon royalty, for Young
was in no position to exploit the minerals himself.
The final decision involving Ethyl's recycling operations in Colum-
bia County was Jameson v. Ethyl Corp." which followed Young in
1964).
80. Id. at 221.
81. 521 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1975).
82. The district court's opinion is not reported. See Young v. Ethyl Corp., 581 F.2d 715 (8th
Cir. 1978).
83. Good faith was found from the permission of the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission for
the recycling operations and from the advice from Arkansas and Texas attorneys that the rule of
capture would apply to the recycling activities. The opinion points out that the district court's
computation of damages far exceeded what would be due from a bad faith trespasser. 581 F.2d. at
718.
84. Id. at 717.
85. This measure was referred to in the second Young opinion in the Eighth Circuit as "the
value of the salt water at the wellhead, less the cost of bringing it to the wellhead." Young v.
Ethyl Corp., 581 F.2d 715, 719 (8th Cir. 1978).
86. 271 Ark. 621, 609 S.W.2d 346 (1980); see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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refusing to apply the rule of capture. The Arkansas Supreme Court
remanded the case to the lower court for a determination of damages
based upon the value of the minerals taken from the plaintiff's land in
excess of natural depletion. Presumably, the court was ordering the de-
fendant to account for the "in-place" value, but the court was silent
concerning the method by which the chancellor should compute the
damages. Whether the court would approve damages based upon roy-
alty, upon the value of the minerals produced less the costs of produc-
tion, or upon some other formula, is unclear. The court said that it
would permit the defendant's activities as long as they were carried out
in good faith.87 In other words, the plaintiff could not seek an injunc-
tion. Injunction is a traditional equitable remedy for trespass and nui-
sance, and this fact might explain why the court held that trespass and
nuisance were not applicable in the case of good faith secondary recov-
ery. It is highly unlikely that the court meant to exclude from the lower
court's discretion a measure of damages based upon good faith
trespass.
The measure of damages for bad faith trespass is the value of the
minerals produced with deduction of expenses of production.88 This
measure of damages is punitive and not limited to making the plaintiff
whole.8 9 Its harshness might be the reason the Arkansas decisions indi-
cate a reluctance to find bad faith in questionable situations. For exam-
ple, in McGraw v. Berry" the Arkansas Supreme Court found that the
defendants' trespass was in good faith not only as to coal removed from
the plaintiff's property before suit was filed and before the defendants
knew of the plaintiff's claim, but also for coal removed after the filing
of suit. Perhaps the court would have found bad faith had the defend-
ants entered and mined the coal with knowledge of the plaintiff's
claim. 1 Other examples-of good faith trespass in which the defendants
were not completely innocent are Ward v. Spadra Coal Co.92 and Na-
87. Id. at 629, 609 S.W.2d at 349.
88. See, e.g., Young v. Ethyl Corp., 581 F.2d 715 (8th Cir. 1978); National Lead Co. v.
Magnet Cove Barium Corp., 231 F. Supp. 208, 213 (W.D. Ark. 1964); Arkansas Power & Light
Co. v. Decker, 179 Ark. 592, 598, 17 S.W.2d 293, 295 (1929); McGraw v. Berry, 170 Ark. 426,
436, 280 S.W. 383, 387 (1926); Ward v. Spadra Coal Co., 168 Ark. 853, 857, 272 S.W. 353, 354
(1925).
89. See National Lead Co. v. Magnet Cove Barium Corp., 231 F. Supp. 208, 218 (W.D.
Ark. 1964).
90. 170 Ark. 426, 280 S.W. 383 (1926).
91. In Texas a defendant who enters and develops the minerals with knowledge of the plain-
tiff's claim is not a good faith trespasser. E.g., Houston Prod. Co. v. Mecom Oil Co., 62 S.W.2d
75 (Tex. Com. App. 1933).
92. 168 Ark. 853, 272 S.W. 353 (1925).
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tional Lead Co. v. Magnet Cove Barium Corp."' In both cases the de-
fendant was aware that its mining activity was close to the boundary of
the plaintiff's property. In Spadra Coal the record indicated that the
defendants might have felt justified in taking the plaintiff's coal be-
cause it would not have been practicable for the plaintiff to mine it. In
National Lead the court found that the defendant did not exercise rea-
sonable care in ascertaining the boundary with the plaintiff's property.
Although some of the foregoing examples involved hard minerals,
there is no reason why a different rule should apply to oil and gas. The
reluctance of Arkansas courts to find bad faith has particular merit for
oil and gas, which are subject to drainage. Certainly a landowner
would prefer a cause of action against a good faith trespasser to a per-
manent, noncompensable loss of oil and gas due to drainage by a neigh-
boring well drawing from the common pool. By the same token, a min-
eral producer accused of trespassing might continue operations if he
knew that he would be liable only for the "good faith" measure of
damages if he were found to be trespassing. That same producer might
discontinue operations altogether if he knew that the harsh or "bad
faith" measure of damages would be awarded against him. Meanwhile,
the producer might lose his lease for lack of production. Therefore,
courts should not find trespassers to be in bad faith except in the most
extreme circumstances.
Any discussion of trespass to oil and gas might be incomplete
without reference to subsurface trespass by directional, or "slant"
wells. If such trespass is by accident or excusable mistake, the tres-
passer should be liable for a "good faith" measure of damages and
perhaps should be enjoined. However, drilling technology is so far ad-
vanced that "the plea of good faith in drilling a trespassing directional
well will rarely be favorably received in court today."" Difficult
problems can arise concerning how a landowner might determine
whether a well is bottomed on his land and whether the statute of limi-
tations should run from the time of the trespass or from the time the
owner discovered or reasonably should have discovered it. There are no
Arkansas cases on these issues. Well-spacing and forced integration
make the directional well trespass a rather unlikely occurrence. Exper-
iences in other jurisdictions are interesting."
93. 231 F. Supp. 208 (W.D. Ark. 1964).
94. 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 24, § 227, at 396.4.
95. See, e.g., R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 7, § 4.2; Morrow, Subsurface Trespass by Devi-
ated Well, I Hous. L. REV. 21 (1963); Note, What is the Proper Remedy in the Slant-Hole
Suit?, 18 Sw. L.J. 486 (1964).
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Damages for Loss of Speculative Value and for Geophysical Trespass
An issue that has generated considerable interest to oil and gas
scholars is whether damages for loss of speculative value should be
awarded against a trespasser who has drilled a dry hole.90 There are no
Arkansas decisions on this issue and other jurisdictions have not been
in accord with each other. 7 The plaintiff in such a case can allege that
the defendant's trespass resulted in the plaintiff's inability to lease the
minerals at the prevailing market rate in the area. However, the fact
that the plaintiff's property has no oil or gas indicates that the plaintiff
has suffered no injury to the mineral estate. Because of the speculative
nature of the oil and gas industry, allowing damages for loss of specula-
tive value seems the more just approach. In one federal district court
case in Arkansas, the plaintiff was estopped from claiming damages for
loss of speculative value."8 Despite the interest generated by this issue,
Professors Williams, Maxwell, and Meyers have suggested that the
problem might have no "lasting importance" because there are very
few decisions on point."9
A relatively new area of liability is for trespass through the use of
geophysical surveys to determine the potential for oil and gas.100 If the
trespasser has entered upon the plaintiff's land and has conducted tests
without the plaintiff's permission, the plaintiff should at least be enti-
tled to the value of the right wrongfully exercised by the trespasser.101
If the survey reveals that the plaintiff's property has no recoverable oil
and gas, the plaintiff may be able to prove damage to speculative value.
Arkansas has had no appellate court decisions on liability for this type
of trespass.
96. See. e.g., Green, What Protection Has a Landowner Against a Trespass which Merely
Destroys the Speculative Value of His Property?, 4 TEx. L. REV. 215 (1926); Quails, Damages
for Dry Hole Trespass, 40 N.D.L. REv. 65 (1964).
97. Texas allows recovery for loss of speculative value. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Kishi, 276
S.W. 190 (Tex. Corn. App. 1925). Contra Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 36 Wyo. 166, 253 P. 862
(1927).
98. Brixey v. Union Oil Co. of California, 283 F. Supp. 353, 364 (W.D. Ark. 1968).
99. H. WILLIAMS, R. MAXWELL & C. MEYERS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF OIL
AND GAS 251 (1979).
100. See generally I H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 24, § 230.
101. Texas does not permit the owner this remedy, but has permitted the plaintiff to waive
the tort and sue in assumpsit for the value of the use and occupation of his land. Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586, 591 (5th Cir. 1957).
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CHAPTER II
MULTIPLE OWNERSHIP OF OIL AND GAS INTERESTS
This chapter concerns the ownership of oil and gas interests by
multiple parties in cotenancy, or undivided ownership. It also concerns
the ownership of such interests by life tenants and remaindermen, in-
cluding ownership by dower and curtesy. Finally, there is a short sec-
tion on the defeasible fee. Some of the problems arising from divided
ownership stem from the interpretation of deeds to mineral interests,
and these issues are addressed in the chapter on deeds.
Undivided Ownership
a. Mineral Development or Lease by a Cotenant
Any mineral interest, including a leasehold interest, can be held in
cotenancy; that is, tenancy-in-common, joint tenancy with right of sur-
vivorship, or tenancy by the entirety.1 One of the most frequent ques-
tions arising from such ownership is the effect of one cotenant's execu-
tion of a mineral lease. Such a lease of an undivided interest does not
bind the other cotenants' interests.' However, if the other cotenants
wish, they can ratify the lease if it covers the mineral interests they
own. In almost all leases, the lessor purports to lease 100% of the min-
erals, even if both parties know that the lessor owns only an undivided
interest.' Thus, in most instances the nonleasing cotenants may ratify.4
However, they might wish to forego this opportunity for the chance of
leasing their interests on more favorable terms.
There is a split of authority in the United States on whether a
mineral cotenant or his lessee commits waste when either produces
1. There are very few cases involving tenancy by the entirety. However, there is one case
from Arkansas, Tyler v. Boucher, 225 Ark. 806, 285 S.W.2d 524 (1956), in which the Arkansas
Supreme Court held that a husband's conveyance of a mineral interest held by the entirety did not
destroy the right of survivorship in the wife, who did not join in the conveyance.
2. See Jones v. Franks Petroleum, Inc., 273 Ark. 161, 617 S.W.2d 369 (1981); Lee v. Strau-
ghan, 146 Ark. 504, 226 S.W. 171 (1920).
3. The reason for this is to permit the doctrine of after-acquired title (or estoppel by deed) to
inure to the benefit of the lessee in the event the lessor subsequently acquires title to a mineral
interest greater than he owned at the time the lease was executed. See McMahon v. Christmann,
157 Tex. 403, 303 S.W.2d 341, 304 S.W.2d 267 (1957).
4. An interesting question could arise concerning the period of time a cotenant should have to
decide whether to ratify. Ratification should not be allowed when it can work an unfair disadvan-
tage to the other party. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 82, comment d (1958).
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minerals without the consent of the other mineral cotenants. The ma-
jority rule is that such production is not waste and that the producing
cotenant or his lessee must account to the nonproducing cotenants their
proportionate shares of production less the reasonable costs of produc-
tion.5 There are a few cases in which the nonproducing tenant has been
awarded damages based upon the royalty he would have received had
he signed a lease.6 These two methods are the same as the damage
formulas for good faith trespass,7 but a cotenant is not a trespasser to
other cotenants unless he has excluded them. However, it seems unfair
to award the nonleasing cotenant only royalty when royalty is what he
would receive had he signed a lease. It appears more equitable to give
the nonleasing tenant what is his: his portion of the minerals less the
reasonable costs of production.
A minority of jurisdictions hold that production by a mineral co-
tenant or his lessee is waste.' In some cases the nonleasing cotenant has
even been able to enjoin production.' Because of the fugacious nature
of oil and gas, an injunction may not be in the best interest of any of
the cotenants, particularly when there is a possibility of drainage. 10
This approach should not be favored except in circumstances when the
operating tenant or his lessee has excluded the other cotenants from
developing the minerals.
Arkansas followed the majority rule in a 1986 case, Fife v.
Thompson.1 Thompson leased all the interests except Fife's one-eighth
interest in a twenty-acre tract. Thompson completed a producing well
and filed suit to impress a lien on Fife's one-eighth interest for the costs
5. This rule was applied in Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1924).
States adopting this approach include Alabama, California, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Oklahoma, and Texas. See 1 E. KUNTZ, OIL AND GAS § 5.3 (1962); 2 H. WILLIAMS & C.
MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 504.1 (1985).
6. See, e.g., Petroleum Exploration Corp. v. Hensley, 284 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1955) (allowing
the royalty measure for production obtained prior to the filing of suit); McIntosh v. Ropp, 233 Pa.
497, 82 A. 949 (1912).
7. Chapter I notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
8. These jurisdictions include Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan and West Virginia. See I E.
KUNTZ, supra note 5, at § 5.4; 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 5, at § 504.2.
9. See, e.g., United Fuel Gas Co. v. Koontz, 113 W. Va. 611, 169 S.E. 328 (1933).
10. If the nonleasing cotenant is responsible for drainage from the property, Louisiana will
not enjoin production. United Gas Pub. Serv. Co. v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co., 176 La.
1024, 147 So. 66 (1933).
I1. 288 Ark. 620, 708 S.W.2d 611 (1986). The court noted that it had "embraced" the rule
in Ashland Oil and Ref. Co. v. Bond, 222 Ark. 696, 263 S.W.2d 74 (1953). Other Arkansas cases
in which the majority rule was recognized include Jones v. Franks Petroleum, 273 Ark. 161, 617
S.W.2d 369 (1981) and Budd v. Ethyl Corp., 251 Ark. 639, 474 S.W.2d 411 (1971), reh'g denied
Jan. 24, 1972.
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of drilling and operating the well. Fife counterclaimed for one-eighth of
the value of the minerals produced plus punitive damages on grounds
that Thompson was a willful trespasser. 2 The supreme court ruled that
the chancellor was correct in characterizing Thompson's status as "tan-
tamount to cotenancy" ' and held for Thompson, citing the majority
rule and noting that if a cotenant were able to bar production, others
could drain the oil and gas from the common pool.
The rights among lessees of cotenants do not parallel the rights
among cotenants. As pointed out in the previous chapter, the court held
in Budd v. Ethyl Corp.14 that a mineral lessee of an undivided interest
has no cause of action against the lessee of another undivided interest
for developing the minerals because each lessee has the same right to
develop the minerals. Of course, this reasoning recognizes that the in-
terest of a lessee is an easement and that title to the minerals does not
pass until the minerals are produced. 15
Because of the statute allowing forced integration," it is unlikely
that the problems of undivided ownership will arise frequently. How-
ever, the problems arise occasionally, as in Fife, in situations involving
production from zones to which no field rules apply because their devel-
opment began before the current statutes were adopted. The Arkansas
legislature has adopted statutes designed for this situation.17 Act 220 of
1937 allows a mineral cotenant or a lessee of a mineral cotenant to
petition the chancery court to appoint a receiver authorized to negoti-
ate and execute a mineral lease subject to the approval of the court. A
lease executed by a receiver appointed pursuant to this act was held to
be void because of improper notice to the interested parties in Davis v.
Schimmel." The constitutionality of the Act itself was not the issue in
that case or in any other reported decision. The Act would probably be
upheld even though its effect is to force a lease upon unwilling owners
of undivided mineral interests. Courts have upheld statutes providing
for compulsory pooling and unitization, 9 which are arguably more ex-
12. Thompson could not integrate Fife's interest into a drilling unit because the production
was from the Smackover Lime, a source of oil that was discovered and being developed prior to
January 1, 1937. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-106 (1971). The court notes this at 288 Ark. 621,
708 S.W.2d 612, n.l.
13. 620 Ark. at 621, 708 S.W.2d at 611-12.
14. 251 Ark. 639, 474 S.W.2d 411 (1971), reh'g denied Jan. 24, 1972.
15. Id. at 642, 474 S.W.2d at 413.
16. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-115 (1971 & Supp. 1985).
17. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-201 to -213.2 (1971).
18. 252 Ark. 1201, 482 S.W.2d 785 (1972).
19. See, e.g., Superior Oil Co. v. Foote, 214 Miss. 857, 59 So. 2d 85 (1952), suggestion of
error overruled, 214 Miss. 857, 59 So. 2d 844 (1952); Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation Commission,
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treme and violative of vested rights than this receivership procedure.
b. Partition
The Arkansas Statutes specifically allow the owner of a mineral
interest to bring an action for partition. 0 As mentioned in Chapter I,
these provisions are not applicable to leasehold interests because a
leasehold is in the nature of an easement. 1 This action for partition is
available when there is no actual production of oil or gas and no out-
standing lease. 22
In any partition action the possibility arises that the partition
might result in hardship as to one or more of the cotenants. A few
cases from other jurisdictions have indicated that partition of a mineral
interest is a matter for judicial discretion in instances when the parti-
tion may be inequitable. Such an inequity might result if one party is
financially unable to purchase at the partition sale and there is ap-
proaching development of oil and gas.2 3 In Overton v. Porterfield24 the
Arkansas Supreme Court said that the mineral partition statute "does
not impose the imperative duty on the court to order a sale in every
case whether a petition is filed by one or more cotenants . *."..- In
Schnitt v. McKellar 6 the court noted this point as "dicta" in Overton
and refused to decide whether partition is a matter for judicial discre-
tion because the defendants did not plead or prove that the partition
would constitute fraud or oppression as to them.2 7 Therefore, the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court has never held that a court may exercise discre-
tion in granting a petition for partition of a mineral interest. It is clear
that under the general partition statutes2 8 partition is an absolute
right.2 9
Partition of a mineral interest under the mineral partition statutes
should be an absolute right despite the dicta in Overton. The legislature
205 Okla. 537, 239 P.2d 1023 (1950).
20. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-401 to -409 (1971).
21. Pasteur v. Niswanger, 226 Ark. 486, 290 S.W.2d 852 (1956). Admittedly, the statutes
are somewhat confusing on this point because § 53-401 specifically refers to the "sale and parti-
tion of the entire oil and gas leasehold interest .
22. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-401 (1971).
23. See, e.g., Strait v. Fuller, 184 Kan. 120, 334 P.2d 385 (1959); Henson v. Bryant, 330
P.2d 591 (Okla. 1958); Wolfe v. Stanford, 179 Okla. 27, 64 P.2d 335 (1937).
24. 206 Ark. 784, 177 S.W.2d 735 (1944).
25. Id. at 789, 177 S.W.2d at 737.
26. 244 Ark. 377, 427 S.W.2d 202 (1968).
27. Id. at 390-91, 427 S.W.2d at 210.
28. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1801 to -1838 (1962 & Supp. 1985).
29. Schnitt v. McKellar, 244 Ark. 377, 387, 427 S.W.2d 202, 208 (1968).
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arguably intended that partition be an absolute right, as the statute
does not indicate that partition is a matter for judicial discretion. Per-
haps more significant is the fact that the legislature apparently appreci-
ated the risk of inequitable consequences of partition, for the statute
permits the court to appoint a receiver for the purpose of leasing the
minerals in the event the court believes that the parties' interests would
be "more fully protected and the value of the various interests of the
parties increased . ". ..",0 Thus it appears that the court has no discre-
tion in whether or not to grant partition but does have discretionary
authority to appoint a receiver for leasing the minerals.
There are no Arkansas cases on partition of a royalty interest.
Such an interest should not be partitionable because it is incorporeal."1
As a practical matter, the issue is unlikely to arise because the payor
divides a royalty into separate payments for each of the co-owners.
Life Estates and Remainder Interests
A mineral interest held by a life tenant and remaindermen
presents a number of problems, including who must sign a lease and
who is entitled to the lease bonus, rentals, and royalty. In some situa-
tions Arkansas statutes provide the answers. In others, Arkansas looks
to common law.
a. Leases of Conventional Life Estates and Remainder Interests
A mineral lessee should obtain leases from both the life tenant and
the remainderman in the case of a conventional life estate.32 A lessee of
the life tenant who has no lease from the remainderman could be sued
for waste by the remainderman in the event the lessee developed the
minerals.88 In two old Arkansas cases this problem has been before the
court. In Cherokee Construction Co. v. Harris,3 4 which involved a
widow's coal lease to her homestead lands, and in Lee v. Straughan,35
which involved a widow's oil and gas lease of her dower interest, the
30. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-406 (Supp. 1985).
31. There is authority to the effect that the owner of the working interest cannot partition
against an overriding royalty owner. Mulsow v. Gerber Energy Corp, 237 Kan. 58, 697 P.2d 1269
(1985); De Mik v. Cargill, 485 P.2d 229 (Okla. 1971).
32. A conventional life estate is one created by devise or grant, not by operation of law (as in
the case of dower or curtesy).
33. A life tenant cannot develop the minerals without being sued for waste by the remainder-
man, in absence of a statute. The life tenant is entitled only to the use of the minerals; i.e., to
interest on the royalty.
34. 92 Ark. 260, 122 S.W. 485 (1909).
35. 146 Ark. 504, 226 S.W. 171 (1920).
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Arkansas Supreme Court held that the lessee had no right to develop
the property without a lease from the remaindermen." Although
neither of these decisions concerned a conventional life estate, the court
held that the rule "applies to all persons whose estate in the land do
[sic] not exceed that of a life-tenant, 3 7 thereby indicating that the rule
is the same for conventional life estates.38 In a similar vein, a lessee of
the remainderman who has no lease from the life tenant would have no
right to develop the minerals until the remainder vested at the death of
the life tenant, which might be after the expiration of the primary term
of the lease.
If the remainder is contingent, the lessee is uncertain to obtain a
valid lease from all interested parties unless a statutory procedure ex-
ists to insure that the lease is binding on all interests. Such a proce-
dure, which is the topic of the following section, exists in Arkansas for
contingent remainders following a life interest that would have been an
entailed estate at common law. In addition, a statute adopted in 1945
applies under very narrow circumstances to contingent remainders.3 9
For any contingent remainder falling outside the scope of these stat-
utes, there is no available procedure to insure a lease binding all inter-
ested parties.
When the interests of both the life tenant and the remainderman
have been leased, the division of the lease proceeds between them has a
parallel in the rules governing distribution of trust assets. For example,
the life tenant is entitled to interest on royalty because this is income,
while the remainderman is entitled to the royalty itself, as it represents
the corpus of the property.'0
36. For the purpose of determining the rights of the parties in this instance, the distinction
between homestead and dower is not important. Lee v. Straughan, 146 Ark. 504, 508, 226 S.W.
171, 172 (1920).
37. Id.
38. As noted in the following section on dower and curtesy, in 1961 the Arkansas legislature
made special rules for lands assigned as dower.
39. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-311 (1971). This section was apparently adopted to cure title in
one situation because the circumstances to which it applies are extremely specific. It applies only
if the life interest has been in existence for 30 or more years, if there has been production of oil
for 20 years under a lease executed by the life tenant, if the creator of the life interest has at-
tempted to convey to the life tenant the creator's interest in the property, and if all the contingent
remaindermen in esse at the time of initial production have attempted to convey their interests by
warranty deed to the life tenant or have executed a lease to the life tenant's lessee. If all these
conditions are met, the deeds and leases of the contingent remaindermen are binding upon all
contingent remaindermen.
40. This was mentioned, but was not the holding, in Dickson v. Renfro, 276 Ark. 223, 228,
634 S.W.2d 104, 106-07 (1982). Apparently this is the majority view. Another method of dividing
royalty between life tenant and remainderman is "to give the life tenant that portion of the roy-
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The allocations of bonus, which is the initial consideration for the
lease, and delay rental payments present more difficult questions. The
general rule is to allocate delay rentals to the life tenant. 4' This seems
logical, because rentals are not payment for depletion of the mineral
estate and thus should not be comparable to the corpus of a trust. Ar-
kansas has never decided this in a definitive case.4
In most jurisdictions the remainderman receives bonus, which is
considered to be royalty paid in advance. 43 This is consistent with fed-
eral tax treatment of bonus as royalty." At least one authority has
cited Arkansas as being among a minority of jurisdictions that allocate
bonus to the life tenant."' However, the Arkansas case cited for this is
Love v. McDonald," which involved a special statutory procedure for
leasing by the life tenant when the life estate would be a fee tail at
common law. Furthermore, the remaindermen in that case were the
children of the life tenant and had agreed to award the lease money to
the life tenant.47 Thus, the holding in Love v. McDonald does not con-
cern the allocation of bonus between a life tenant and remaindermen
when there is a conventional life estate. All that one can conclude is
that the allocation of bonus, like the allocation of delay rentals, has not
been decided by the Arkansas Supreme Court in the case of a conven-
tional life estate.
There is one situation in which the common law, by the "open
mine doctrine," allocates royalty instead of interest on royalty to the
life tenant. If there is production at the time the life estate commences,
this doctrine assumes that the grantor or testator creating the life inter-
est intended for the life tenant to receive the royalty.4 Of course, the
grantor or testator may specifically provide otherwise."
The open mine doctrine is generally applied to life interests cre-
alty accruing in any one year equivalent to the computed actuarial value of the life estate in the
land." See 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 5, § 512.2, at 644.
41. See, e.g., Weekley v. Weekley, 126 W. Va. 90, 27 S.E.2d 591, 595 (1943). See generally,
2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 5, § 512.2, at 646.
42. In Love v. McDonald, 201 Ark. 882, 148 S.W.2d 170 (1941), the Arkansas Supreme
Court upheld a statutory procedure that permits the remaindermen to share all lease proceeds,
including the delay rental payments, with the life tenant if the life estate is one that would have
been a fee tail at common law. This is discussed infra, note 68 and accompanying text.
43. See 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 5, § 512.2, at 646.
44. Id.
45. id.
46. 201 Ark. 882, 148 S.W.2d 170 (1941).
47. Id. at 883 n.2, 148 S.W.2d at 171 n.2.
48. See H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 591 (6th ed. 1984).
49. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mitchell, 157 Tex. 346, 303 S.W.2d 352 (1957).
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ated by operation of law as well as to conventional life estates. 50 In the
1909 decision in Cherokee Construction Co. v. Harris51 and in the
1920 decision in Lee v. Straughan'5 2 the Arkansas Supreme Court rec-
ognized, but did not apply, the doctrine to a life interest created by
operation of law because there was no "open mine" at the time the life
interest commenced.53 These decisions thus indicate that Arkansas
would apply the doctrine to life estates created by operation of law.
However, as pointed out in the following section, Arkansas now has
specific statutory provisions governing the lease proceeds from land as-
signed as dower or curtesy to a surviving spouse." These provisions, not
the open mine doctrine, would apply in the appropriate circumstances.
A perplexing problem arises if production does not begin until af-
ter the vesting of the life estate under a lease that was in effect prior to
the vesting of the life estate. Under these circumstances, the mine has
not been "opened" but the execution of a mineral lease has indicated
that the grantor or settlor intended for the minerals to be developed. In
the 1925 decision of Warren v. Martin,"5 the Arkansas Supreme Court,
quoting from a holding in another jurisdiction, noted that "'a mine
lawfully leased to be opened is an open mine within the reason of the
rule permitting a life tenant to work open mines'. ' '5' The issue in that
case was whether a widow was entitled to receive delay rental pay-
ments, which would give her the power to waive forfeiture of the lease
when payments were not tendered as required. The court, by reference
to the open mine doctrine, held that she was entitled to receive the
delay rentals. The decision fails to note that the life tenant generally
receives delay rentals whether or not the open mine doctrine applies.
Despite this, it appears that the court would apply the open mine doc-
trine if the lease was in effect at the time the life estate commenced,
even if there was no production at that time. This is in accordance with
most authority on the question.
If a lease "opens the mine," and that lease expires during the life
tenancy, does another lease, executed by the life tenant and remainder-
50. Id.
51. 92 Ark. 260, 122 S.W. 485 (1909).
52. 146 Ark. 504, 507, 226 S.W. 171, 171 (1920).
53. In Cherokee Construction the widow's interest was a homestead interest; in Lee it was a
dower interest.
54. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-204 (Supp. 1985).
55. 168 Ark. 682, 272 S.W. 367 (1925).
56. Id. at 694, 272 S.W. at 371 (citing Koen v. Bartlett, 41 W. Va. 559, 23 S.E. 664
(1895)); see also Poole v. Union Trust Co., 191 Mich. 162, 157 N.W. 430 (1916).
57. See 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 5, § 513, at 656.1.
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men, reopen the mine? This question has been answered in the negative
by decisions in Oklahoma68 and Texas,59 but there are no decisions in
Arkansas addressing this issue.
b. Lease of Estate that Would Be Fee Tail at Common Law
There is one situation in which the Arkansas statutes permit a life
tenant to petition the chancery court for authority to execute a lease
binding on the remaindermen." These statutes, adopted as Act 76 in
1929, apply only to a life tenant whose interest at common law would
have been an entailed estate, or a fee tail." Generally speaking, the fee
tail was created by grant or devise using the words "to E and the heirs
of his body," or "to E for life, remainder to the heirs of his body."
Such language in Arkansas creates an interest similar to a life estate in
E, with a contingent remainder in the heirs of E's body.4 The legisla-
ture decided to permit a lease by the life tenant in this situation, pre-
sumably to provide for development of the property as a protection
against drainage. In absence of this type of statutory provision, a lessee
wishing to develop the property could obtain, at best, leases from re-
maindermen whose interests were only contingent.
This statutory procedure requires the life tenant to join as respon-
dents all contingent remaindermen and to include the terms of the pro-
posed lease in the petition." The statutory provisions for allocation of
lease proceeds depart from common law rules governing conventional
life estates. Upon approval of the lease, the court awards the life tenant
title in fee simple to a portion of the minerals, not to exceed an undi-
vided '/,6." The life tenant then becomes a fee simple owner of an undi-
vided mineral interest, free of all claims of remaindermen," 5 and is en-
titled to a share of the lease proceeds and to compensation out of the
lease proceeds for damages resulting from operations or delay thereof."
The court appoints a bonded trustee for the benefit of the remainder-
58. Nutter v. Stockton, 626 P.2d 861 (Okla. 1981).
59. Moore v. Vines, 474 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. 1971).
60. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-302 to -310 (1971).
61. For a more detailed analysis of the fee tail, see T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO
ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 28.34 (2d ed. 1984).
62. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-405 (1971) and the annotations.
63. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-303 (1971).
64. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-306(a) (1971).
65. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-308 (1971).
66. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-306(a) (1971). If the court awards the life tenant an undivided '/
16 mineral interest, the tenant is entitled to of a 1/ royalty. Id.
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men and reversioners. 67
The constitutionality of these provisions was upheld in the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court decision in Love v. McDonald.6 8 The defendant
contended that a lease obtained under these provisions was not market-
able because the act was violative of state and federal due process. The
court upheld the act, even though it provided for vesting in the life
tenant some of the interest of the contingent remaindermen. The court
reasoned that the owner of a contingent interest is not entitled to the
due process protection extended to the owners of vested property inter-
ests.69 The court also upheld the act against contentions that it autho-
rizes a life tenant to commit waste and is violative of state constitu-
tional protections against impairment of contracts.
c. Interests Subject to Dower and Curtesy
Interests in oil and gas, as property interests, are subject to dower
and curtesy laws [hereinafter dower laws] .70 Generally, Arkansas stat-
utes provide for dower to be a one-third life interest in real property
and a one-third interest absolutely in personal property if the deceased
spouse left surviving a child or children. 1 If the deceased spouse left no
child or children, the provisions for dower vary according to whether
the real property is ancestral and whether the dower is claimed against
creditors or collateral heirs 7 Anyone examining title +o minera s
should be aware of these and other statutes governing dower and
should also be aware that a spouse can take as an heir if the deceased
67. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 53-306(b) (1971). A reversioner is one to whom the property reverts
in the event there are no remaindermen to take at the death of the life tenant. In the case of a fee
tail, the reversion would be in the estate of the grantor or the testator.
68. 201 Ark. 882, 148 S.W.2d 170 (1941).
69. Id. at 889, 148 S.W.2d at 174-75.
70. The general Arkansas statutes governing dower and curtesy are in ARK. STAT. ANN. §§
61-201 to -232 (1971 & Supp. 1985). The Arkansas legislature amended these provisions in 1981
so that dower and curtesy are treated alike.
71. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-201 to -202 (Supp. 1985).
72. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-206 (Supp. 1985) provides as follows:
If a person die [dies], leaving a surviving spouse and no children, such surviving spouse
shall be endowed in fee simple of one-half ( ) of the real estate of which such deceased
person died seized where said estate is a new acquisition and not an ancestral estate;
and one-half ( ) of the personal estate, absolutely, and in his or her own right, as
against collateral heirs; but, as against creditors, said surviving spouse shall be invested
with one-third (1h) of the real estate in fee simple if a new acquisition and not ancestral
and of one-third ( ) of the personal property absolutely. Provided, if the real estate of
such deceased person be an ancestral estate, the surviving spouse shall be endowed in a
life estate of one-half ( ) of said estate as against collateral heirs, and one-third (A) as
against creditors.
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spouse leaves no descendants, according to the Arkansas statutes on
intestacy. 78
Although the general statutes on dower and curtesy apply to oil
and gas interests, Arkansas also has specific statutory provisions on
dower that relate to oil and gas leases and their proceeds:
If a person dies, leaving a surviving spouse and a child or children, the
surviving spouse shall be entitled, absolutely and in his or her own
right, to one-third (/) of all money received from the sale of timber,
oil and gas or other mineral leases, oil and gas or other mineral roy-
alty or mineral sales and one-third (A) of the money derived from any
and all royalty run to the credit of the royalty owners from any oil or
gas well or royalty accruing from the production of other mines or
minerals in lands in which he or she has a dower, curtesy or home-
stead interest, unless said surviving spouse shall have relinquished
same in legal form."4
This provision is consistent with the general statute on dower in
personalty.75
The provisions on assignment of dower in Arkansas change the
common law with respect to the leasing of minerals and to the division
of the lease proceeds. The heirs of the deceased spouse must grant to
the surviving spouse the right to execute oil and gas leases on land set
aside as dower, and the surviving spouse is entitled to all bonus and
delay rentals for his or her life.7 This provision changes the common
law rule that a mineral lease must be executed by both the life tenant
and the remaindermen. It also changes the general rule that bonus is
allocated to the remaindermen. A related provision entitles the surviv-
ing spouse to royalty payments for as long as he or she lives. 7 This
changes the common law rule that the life tenant is entitled to interest
on royalty, not to the royalty itself.
d. Defeasible Fees
Defeasible fees are interests that tend to puzzle the first-year law
student, partly because there are three basic types of defeasible fee and
these three types themselves are given different names by different au-
thorities. For purposes of this treatise it is helpful to identify them as
73. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-149(b) (1971).
74. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-204 (Supp. 1985).
75. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-202 (Supp. 1985). Accrued royalty is personalty. See Chapter I
note 15 and accompanying text.
76. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-724 (Supp. 1985).
77. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-725 (Supp. 1985).
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follows: the fee simple determinable, the fee simple upon condition sub-
sequent, and the fee simple subject to an executory limitation. Each of
these interests is characterized by a grant or devise in fee simple which
will terminate upon the happening of a certain event.
A textbook example of a fee simple determinable (or a determina-
ble fee) is "to A and his heirs so long as the property is used for church
purposes." In the event that the property is not used for church pur-
poses, the title reverts to the grantor, who holds a possibility of re-
verter. The general rule is that A, as the owner of the fee, may develop
the minerals or may execute an oil and gas lease without the consent of
the owner of the possibility of reverter.7 8 In the event that A conveys
his interest by deed, devises it by will, or dies intestate, his successors
in interest may likewise lease or develop the minerals without the con-
sent of the owner of the possibility of reverter. Like the owner of a fee
simple determinable, the owner of one of the other types of defeasible
fee may develop the minerals without the consent of those who own
contingent interests in the property. 9
In the 1982 decision of Dickson v. Renfro0 the Arkansas Supreme
Court arguably recognized an exception to this general rule. The grant
before the court was to a husband and wife and their heirs, but in the
event that they had no children, the title was to vest in others. The
grantees had no children and the husband died. The Arkansas Supreme
Court held that the wife was not entitled to royalties from production
which began after the husband's death. The court reasoned that the
wife's estate terminated with the husband's death, as the only way she
could have kept her interest was to have children by her husband. But
the court declared that even if the wife did not lose her interest at the
death of the husband, she had a duty not to commit waste. The court
cited the Restatement of Property, which would permit the owner of a
future interest to enjoin the owner of a defeasible fee for waste when
there is a reasonable probability that the future interest will vest and
when the owner of the defeasible estate does not have the power to
destroy the future interest.81 The decision thus indicates that the Ar-
kansas Court will look to circumstances such as those outlined in the
78. See, e.g., Frensley v. White, 208 Okla. 209, 254 P.2d 982 (1953); Davis v. Skipper, 125
Tex. 364, 83 S.W.2d 318 (1935). Of course, A must make certain that the development of the
minerals would not breach the condition that the property be used for church purposes.
79. See I E. Ku~rrz, supra note 5, § 7.1, at 161.
80. 276 Ark. 223, 634 S.W.2d 104 (1982).
81. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 193 (1936), cited in Dickson, 276 Ark. at 229, 634
S.W.2d at 107.
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Restatement in determining the right of the owner of a defeasible fee
to lease and develop the minerals.

